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1 Introduction
Climate and energy policy has developed into one of the most important com-
mon EU policies. In December 2008, general objectives known as the Climate 
and Energy 20-20-20 Package were approved by the European Council. It is a 
set of legally binding acts to ensure that the EU achieves three targets by the year 
2020: a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), 20% energy 
from renewable sources, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency.1 At three 
meetings in 2014, the Council discussed and reaffirmed the EU’s efforts to combat 
climate change and adopted the EU’s framework goals by 2030. The goals for re-
newables and energy efficiency were revised upward in 2018 and now stipulate at 
least 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), at least a 32% share 
of renewable energy (originally 27%), and at least a 32.5% improvement in energy 
efficiency (originally 27%). In 2018, the European Commission submitted a pro-
posal for a Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021–2027, proposing a target 
of 25% of the entire EU budget for climate goals (European Commission, 2018).
A European Green Deal was one of the first objectives of the new President 
of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen (2019), and in December 
2019, the European Council endorsed the aim of a climate-neutral EU by 2050. 
However, as stated in the conclusions, “at this stage, one member state cannot 
commit to implement this objective as far as it is concerned” (European Coun-
cil, 2019) and the European Council would come back to this problem in June 
2020. The conclusions did not include the country’s name, but it was Poland, 
where hard coal is the largest raw material for electricity production. Moreover, 
Poland is currently not planning to abandon hard coal burning as the primary 
source of electricity production. The current shape of the energy sector in Poland 
(and other CEE countries), including high dependence on hard coal, is largely 
a heritage of the past (Horváthová and Dobbins, 2019). Poland has the largest 
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amount of hard coal by EU comparison, and it has been one of its most important 
industries for many decades, long before the 1989 transformation. Later, the size 
of the hard coal-mining (HCM) sector in Poland decreased, but its political and 
economic significance remains high. Due to the many active coal organizations 
and their ties with political parties as well as the strong political polarization of 
society and political calendar, mining trade unions are among important interest 
groups in Poland, not least because the social movement and the then trade union 
“Solidarity” was crucial in overthrowing communism.
The Czech Republic is the EU’s second-largest hard coal producer. Together 
with Poland, Hungary, and Estonia, it blocked the adoption of the climate neu-
trality target for 2050 at the June 2019 Council meeting. However, the level of 
hard coal extraction is much lower than in Poland, resulting in its lower economic 
and political significance. Nevertheless, the policies of these strong coal-mining 
states directly affect the EU’s climate and energy goals. Against this background, 
this chapter explores how the main organized interests and, in particular, trade 
unions impact their energy policies and, more specifically, how they shape the 
Polish and Czech governments’ positions on the EU’s climate and energy policy.
Drawing on the theoretical literature on interest groups, I explore how HCM 
trade unions justify their position toward EU climate and energy policy. Follow-
ing up on Mahoney’s observations (2007) that the more attention the public pays 
to a specific decision, the more difficult it should be for special interest groups to 
influence outcomes, I explore whether mining trade unions have adopted a spe-
cific tactic, i.e., either “silencing” the issue (making it easier for them to achieve 
their goals) or “publicizing” their position and striving to persuade other social 
groups. I, then, address to what extent the positions and activities of HCM un-
ions have shaped government policy toward EU climate and energy policy. And, 
finally, I address why the Czech Republic changed its position at the December 
2019 European Council meeting. While doing so, I specifically focus on how 
organized interests produced different outcomes in both countries.
In the upcoming section, I present my theoretical assumptions. The third sec-
tion is devoted to the empirical analysis, which explores the trade unions’ attitudes 
toward EU climate and energy policy, the arguments they use, while also assessing 
their influence on both governments’ positions. In the final section, I readdress 
the research questions. As data sources, I rely on official trade union documents 
and statements by their leaders. Documents from Polish trade unions were ob-
tained directly from representatives of these unions and/or their websites, while 
the Czech data on HCM unions were generally available on the internet.
2  Trade unions as organized interest groups – theoretical 
assumptions
Interest groups are key actors at the national, regional, and global level (Orach, 
Schlüter, & Österblom, 2017) as they enable people to express their opinions to 
decision-makers (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). Taking into account three criteria – 
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organization, political interest, and informality (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 
2008) – trade unions are among the most prominent interest groups. During 
the political and economic transformation, the significance of large, formal, 
membership- based Polish and Czech trade unions has declined, whereas rel-
atively small NGOs have become more important (Ekiert, Kubik, & Wenzel, 
2017). Despite this general assessment, trade unions are still relatively vigorous 
and influential in some sectors, in particular those under state ownership (e.g., 
education, health care, railways, energy). Their political significance is primarily 
due to their resources, the high level of unionization in these sectors, their strong 
commitment to the political process and links to political parties, and their abil-
ity to mobilize resources (including organizing strikes, blocking transport infra-
structure, and even using violence).
The restructuring of the Polish and Czech HCM sectors has been going on 
almost continuously since 1990. This was necessary primarily for economic rea-
sons, whereby the general goal was (and still is) to sustain the profitability of 
coal-mining. Among other things, this has resulted in a decrease in production, 
the number of active mines, and employment. The objectives of the EU climate 
and energy policy are the next big challenge for the HCM sector, especially in 
Poland, which forced the HCM trade unions to take a position and aim to shape 
government policy.
The social, economic, and political contexts of interest group activity are 
one of the key factors shaping their real impact on policy outcomes. Hence, 
how interest groups convey their arguments may be crucial. As Beyers, Eising & 
Maloney (2008, p. 1106) write, “this aspect is often called political advocacy, 
which refers to all efforts to push public policy in a specific direction on the be-
half of constituencies or a general political idea.” We can assume that the more an 
interest group raises arguments going beyond its own particular interests and that 
can be recognized by other social groups, the greater the chance of influencing 
policy outcomes. This strategy may be particularly important regarding energy 
and climate issues, which de facto directly affects all social groups, individuals, and 
economic sectors. Thus, essentially, every political party aspiring to power takes 
a stand on energy and climate due to their fundamental importance. Therefore, 
the right strategy of a given interest group, appropriate instruments for its imple-
mentation, and implementation itself are keys to achieving goals.
It is particularly important how significant and present an issue is in the public 
space in which a given interest group operates. As Christine Mahoney (2007) 
states, interest group influence may depend on the salience of a given problem, 
that is, the less notice public opinion pays to a given issue, the greater the chances 
for the interest group to shape the final policy decision. However, argumenta-
tively “going beyond” its own particular interests, and presenting its activity as 
defending the interests of other social groups, may also be an effective strategy 
for interest groups.
In general, though, it is notoriously difficult to measure the influence of or-
ganized interests. Yet qualitative comparative analysis (Horváthová & Dobbins, 
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2019) provides a partial solution to this challenge. Following Dür (2008) and 
taking into account the specifics of the topic of the study and its aims, I, there-
fore, draw on the preference attainment method. To reconstruct events, it is nec-
essary to identify (1) interest groups and the issues on which they take positions 
and try to influence policy outcomes, (2) the most important contextual factors, 
(3) the most important other engaged stakeholders, (4) and the final policy out-
come. This helps us to trace the actual impact of interest groups.
In the following, I show that numerous factors were crucial in explaining 
the divergent developments in both countries. Besides Poland being the larg-
est producer of hard coal and having a large number of workers in this sector, 
several very important factors explain the advantageous position of HCM trade 
unions despite the steady decline of the economic importance of coal, i.e., the 
state’s control over the sector, the energy mix based on hard coal combustion, the 
number, density, and level of organization of mining trade unions, and political 
involvement and close ties with political parties. Moreover, history is key be-
cause “Solidarity” was not only a trade union but, most of all, a social movement 
opposing the communist authorities. Despite being the second-largest hard coal 
producer in the EU, the Czech coal-mining sector and trade unions operating in 
it are much smaller. Its share in energy production is very small, while sector em-
ployment is several times lower than in Poland, and general mining production 
more than 12 times less. There is de facto one trade union in the entire hard coal 
sector, whose influence on political decisions is relatively low.
3 Empirical analysis
Trade unions in Poland are grouped into three confederations: Independ-
ent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny Związek 
Zawodowy “Solidarność”), All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (Ogólnopolskie 
Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ), and Trade Unions Forum (Forum 
Związków Zawodowych, FZZ). In terms of significance and political influence, the 
most important are: National Hard Coal Mining Section “Solidarity” (Krajowa 
Sekcja Górnictwa Wę gla Kamiennego “Solidarność”), which is the organizational 
unit of NSZZ Solidarność, Miners’ Trade Union in Poland (Związek Zawodowy 
Górników w Polsce, ZZGwP), belonging to OPZZ, and the Trade Union “Kadra” 
(Związek Zawodowy “Kadra”, ZZ “Kadra”), belonging to FZZ.
In 2017, the level of unionization both in Poland and in the Czech Republic was 
12%, which was significantly below the European average (28% in 2017). Trade 
union density has dropped in both countries in recent years compared to 2000: 
in Poland by 4% and in the Czech Republic by 6.9% (Vandaele, 2019). In Poland, 
the trade union system is highly pluralistic, and there are about 25,000 individual 
trade unions. Three-quarters of all company unions belong to one of the three 
trade union confederations: NSZZ Solidarność, OPZZ, or FZZ (Trappmann, 2012) 
(see below). According to data for 2012, NSZZ Solidarność had around 623,000 
members, OPZZ around 793,000 members, and FZZ around 408,000 members.2
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The biggest Czech trade union confederation is the Czech-Moravian Confed-
Č ˇeration of Trade Unions ( eskomoravská konfederace odborových svazuº , CMKOS). In 
ˇ2015, 29 trade unions with approximately 287,000 members3 belonged to CM-
KOS. The most important trade union operating in the HCM sector is the Trade 
Union of Mining, Geology and Oil Industry Workers (Odborovy Svaz Pracovníkuº 
Hornictví, Geologie a Naftového Pruºmyslu, OS PHGN). Within the framework of OS 
PHGN, there is an Association of Mining Unions (Sdružení hornických odboruº , SHO).
3.1 Polish trade unions’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
Polish trade unions operating in the HCM sector have long been strongly op-
posed to many key assumptions of the EU’s climate and energy policy. For exam-
ple, in a 2014 letter to the then Prime Minister Donald Tusk, NSZZ Solidarność 
took the position that EU goals for 2030 to reduce CO2 emissions and increase 
the share of renewable energy are “from the point of view of the Polish raison 
d’état absolutely unacceptable” and would mean the loss of several hundred thou-
sand jobs and an increase in energy prices. (NSZZ Solidarność, 2014). In the same 
year, in a joint petition to Donald Tusk, mining trade unions called for vetoing 
the so-called second EU energy and climate package, “taking into account Polish 
socio-economic conditions and the state’s energy security” (Związki Zawodowe, 
2014a). This view was repeated in the letter of the mining trade unions to the 
then Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (Związki Zawodowe, 2014b). All three major 
mining trade unions – ZZ Kadra, NSZZ Solidarność, and ZZG – in Poland called 
the participants of the February 2018 meeting with the Polish Ministry of En-
ergy “eco-terrorists” (Związki Zawodowe, 2018a).
ZZ Kadra recognizes the threats arising from the functioning of the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme in Poland, which in its view may result in the loss of hun-
dreds of thousands of jobs. ZZ Kadra in 2017 expressed support for the general 
idea of establishing the Just Transition Fund to supplement the European Re-
gional Development Fund and European Social Fund and being financed from 
the ETS system in the amount of 2% of revenues (Kadra, 2017).
HCM trade unions in Poland were very active on the occasion of the Katow-
ice COP24 summit in 2018. The international scale of the summit and related 
events have been evoked by trade unions to convince Polish and foreign public 
opinion and political decision-makers of their arguments. Cooperation among 
mining trade unions and a unified position strengthened their message and posi-
tion in seeking to influence political authorities. Thus, in line with Klüver (2011) 
and Mahoney (2007), they aimed to build a coalition and raise arguments that 
could be considered justified by wider social groups.
In the petition of the National Section of Hard Coal Mining NSZZ Solidar-
ność from January 21, 2019, statements by representatives of the Polish authori-
ties regarding COP24 Katowice were “more or less in line with the mainstream 
current in COP24 – trend toward decarbonization, phasing out of coal, which 
for our state, and especially for Upper Silesia and the Dąbrowa Basin, means 
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economic death and permanent impoverishment of society.” The announce-
ment of “a drastic reduction in the share of coal in the Polish energy mix” 
contained in the Polish Energy Policy until 2040 was also criticized (NSZZ 
Solidarność, 2019a).
The opposition of the Polish Prime Minister to climate neutrality as a EU goal 
until 2050, expressed at the June 2019 European Council meeting, was echoed 
´by the Executive Board of the Slą sko-Dąbrowski Region of NSZZ “Solidarność” 
with huge approval. According to NSZZ Solidarność, the acceptance of such a 
plan would mean “a catastrophe for the Polish economy and permanent impov-
erishment of the inhabitants of our state.” The Prime Minister’s position was rec-
ognized as “the first example of successful pursuit of the Polish raison d’état in the 
area of EU climate and energy policy in many years” (NSZZ Solidarność 2019b).
In a letter containing comments on the draft Polish energy policy until 2050, 
ZZ Kadra expressed the view that the objectives of the EU climate policy until 
2030 for Poland are “unrealistic” and the energy industry based on Polish hard 
coal and lignite is “the surest investment in the future and security of the state” 
(Kadra, 2015). According to ZZ Kadra, Poland’s energy policy should be based 
on hard coal and lignite, followed only by natural gas and renewable energy 
sources (Kadra, 2017a).
Związek Zawodowy Górników (Miners’ Trade Union) in Poland also took a 
critical stance and negatively assessed the assumed decline in the importance of 
hard coal as an energy resource. It argued that Poland’s own hard coal and lignite 
resources ensure the country’s energy security and that the reduction of hard coal 
in Poland’s energy policy is already part of the European Commission’s policy 
for reducing CO2 emissions. This will result in the need to further restructure 
the HCM sector, job losses, and thus Poland’s loss of energy sovereignty and 
degradation of the main HCM regions, i.e., Upper Silesia, Małopolska, Lublin 
(ZZGP, 2015).
3.2 Czech trade unions’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
In recent years, the trade union operating in the Czech HCM sector has fo-
cused on social problems and paid less attention to the EU energy and climate 
policy. Following the announcement of insolvency by New World Resources 
(May 2016), the OKD company was nationalized. The mining trade union 
strongly supported nationalization and blamed all Czech governments after 1991 
for OKD’s bankruptcy (Stanovisko Sdružení, 2017). OS PHGN mainly focuses 
on the annual negotiation of collective agreements and higher-level collective 
agreements (Kolektivní smlouvy vyššího stupně ). These documents regulate matters 
related to working conditions, such as working time, remuneration, work safety, 
etc. Regarding social issues, two very important events in the HCM industry in 
which OS PHGN was engaged were the reduction of the retirement age for min-
ers and regulation (Act 167/2016) and mitigating the social effects of restructuring 
or termination of activities of entities dealing in HCM concerning OKD.
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The OS PHGN trade union program neither for 2012–2016 (OS PHGN, 
2012) nor for 2016–2020 (OS PHGN 2016a) contains any specific provisions 
regarding the EU energy and climate policy. Much more important was the 
content of the call to the Czech Government, which was adopted at the VIII 
Congress of the OS PHGN in March 2016. According to participants, the state’s 
energy security can only be ensured thanks to its own natural resources, and the 
greater the independence on imported raw materials, the higher the level of se-
curity of the Czech Republic. Trade unionists of OS PHGN called on the Czech 
government not to succumb to the “mindless” pressure of “ecological fanatics” 
at the national, European, and global level (OS PHGN, 2016b).
To sum up, the attitude toward the goals of the EU energy and climate policy 
of all major Polish and Czech HCM trade unions is essentially the same. This 
also applies to OS PHGN, the de facto only Czech HCM trade union. However, 
it should be emphasized that while Polish mining unions devoted much attention 
to the EU energy and climate policy, OS PHGN focused on the survival of OKD 
after the bankruptcy of New World Resources and the (effective) fight for social 
rights. The position on the EU energy and climate policy was expressed by trade 
union activists (see Table 10.1).
3.3 HCM trade union arguments justifying their stances
Based on official documents and interviews with Czech trade union activists4 on 
the internet, Polish and Czech HCM trade unions put forward arguments, which 
can be categorized as follows (Table 10.1).
It is apparent that the arguments of Polish and Czech mining trade unions 
coincide and their rhetorical tactic is the same, i.e., although interest groups like 
trade unions “exclude[…] broad movements and waves of public opinion that 
may influence policy outcomes” (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008, p. 1106), 
mining trade unions refer to arguments that go beyond their particular interests 




Related to climate 
change
- “the opinions of scientists regarding the impact of man 
on climate change and the effects of these changes are 
differentiated” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
- “global warming theses are based on a scientific theory that 
has not yet been reliably proven” (Sábel, 2017).
- “CO2 can be absorbed by forests” and coal can be used in a 







Related to the 
desirability of 
EU climate and 
energy policy
- “the EU has a small share of global CO2 emissions and thus a 
small impact on the Earth’s climate” (Sábel, 2019b).
-  “costs of climate policy should be borne primarily by 
consumers of goods and services containing a carbon footprint 
from richer countries, and not their producers from poorer 
countries” (Związki zawodowe, 2018b);
-  “EU policy is the result of lobbying corporations operating in 
the renewable energy sector” (Sábel, 2019a).
-  “coal burning by utility power engineering does not 
contribute to the formation of smog in the least” and CO2 “is 





-  “EU’s climate and energy policy will lead to the EU 
becoming dependent on imports of natural gas and coal from 
other states” (Sábel, 2019a).
-  “solar and wind power plants are unreliable” (Sábel, 2017).
-  “considering that Czech nuclear power plants are aging, 
the need to import natural gas, the instability of energy 
production from renewable sources to ensure energy security 
and affordable energy prices for individual consumers and 
industry, coal will be irreplaceable” (Franta, 2019).
-  “Poland should ensure energy security based its raw materials” 
(Społeczny Pre_COP24).
-  “COP24 member states should be free to shape their energy 
mix” (Społeczny Pre_COP24).
Social -  “liquidating hundreds of thousands of jobs” (NSZZ 
Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “permanent impoverishment of society” (NSZZ Solidarność, 
2019b).
-  “worsening of the labor market and social security situation” 
(Kadra, 2015).
-  decarbonization is a “huge threat” for Poland and the future 
of Polish families (NSZZ, Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “increase in energy prices for households” (Kadra, 2017; 
Pytlík, 2016);
-  “climate policy and environmental protection must not lead to 
energy poverty” (Kadra, 2014).
Financial -  “very high financial cost – for Poland at least EUR 200 
billion” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “stunting economic development” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “electricity produced from solar and wind power is very 
expensive” (Sábel, 2017).
-  “higher energy prices” (Związki zawodowe, 2018a).




Related to the 
nature of the 
debate on 
climate change 
and EU energy 
and climate 
policy
-  “the discussion on climate change is dominated by 
propaganda and manipulation” (NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “the public debate is dominated by IPCC reports, treated as 
revealed truth, not subject to any discussion or verification 
although IPCC forecasts are not later confirmed by reality” 
(NSZZ Solidarność, 2019b).
-  “the EU seems to be ruled by ecological and climatological 
fanatics” (Sábel, 2019b).
-  “ just transition is only an empty slogan” (NSZZ Solidarność, 
2019b).
-  “avoiding discrimination against states whose economies 
are particularly dependent on fossil fuels” (Społeczny 
Pre_COP24).
and embrace the general public. In other words, they aim to extrapolate their 
positions to other social groups, which are not directly or only indirectly con-
nected with the sector.
3.4  Assessing the impact of trade unions on the Polish and Czech 
governments’ positions toward EU climate and energy policy
As stated in the theoretical part, the conditions in which interest groups operate 
and try to influence political decisions are of key importance for assessing their 
impact. “Interest groups do not develop or operate in a vacuum” (Thomas, 2004, 
p. 67), and their influence is “highly conditional” (Orach, Schlüter, & Österblom, 
2017, p. 91). The first group of factors concerns the size and employment of the 
hard coal-mining sector for the Polish and Czech energy balance. The basic data 
for the period 1990–2018 are included in Table 10.2. It should be noted that cur-
rently about 83% of all hard coal produced in the EU is mined in Poland. However, 
the Czech share is only about 6%. What is striking, though, is the very large drop 
in production, employment and the number of active mines compared to the be-
ginning of the system transformation, both in Poland and in the Czech Republic.
Other key factors affecting Poland’s energy and climate policy are its high 
dependency on coal for electricity production – mainly hard coal (47% in 2018) 
and brown coal (29% in 2018). As reflected in Table 10.3, this is well above the 
EU average, and the share of electricity produced from hard coal in Poland is by 
far the highest in the EU. The Czech situation is completely different – it pro-
duces only 5% of electricity from hard coal, while lignite (43%) is much more 
important. The importance of hard coal is greater in the heating sector – in 2014, 
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it generated 17% of heat (Rečková, Rečka, & Ščasný, 2017). Secondly, the Czech 
Republic is a significant net exporter of electricity, while Poland consumes more 
electricity than it can produce and the shortages must be covered by import.
The document Poland’s energy policy until 2040 stipulates that in 2030 about 
56%–60% of electricity will be produced from coal in Poland. This means a slow 
phasing out of coal as a raw material (in 2018 it was 76%, Table 10.2) due to the 
lack of a real alternative in the short and medium term.
Another significant impediment to a more progressive energy policy is that 
the government – which HCM unions try to influence – is simultaneously the 
actual owner of almost all mines in Poland (directly or indirectly through subsid-
iaries).5 The same applies in the Czech Republic, since the only producer, OKD, 
until 2017 owned by New World Resources NV, was nationalized again. Hence, 
the Polish and Czech governments play multiple roles simultaneously: they are 
regulators at the national level, policy-makers at the EU level, and owners. De-
cisions regarding the state’s position in the EU are, therefore, taken by mine 
owners whose future depends on these decisions. Moreover, the Polish govern-
ment controls all large energy companies, which are the main recipients of coal 
from state-owned mines. This causes a conflict of interest – on the one hand, the 
state as the entity controlling the energy sector is concerned about the cheapest 
coal supplies (even from imports), on the other hand, it is against the interests 
of mines, which are also state-owned. As a result, energy companies – whose 
boards are staffed by political operatives – try to balance between economic ra-
tionality and concern for the financial results of enterprises and expectations of 
TABLE 10.2  Hard coal in Poland, the Czech Republic and the EU – selected data










2008 83.4 12.6 n.a.
2004 99.2 13.3 n.a.


















1990 387.9 71.7 n.a.








1990 70 27 n.a.
Source: https://euracoal.eu/info/euracoal-eu-statistics/ (21 December 2019), Euracoal (2005), 
Euracoal (2013), Euracoal (2018), Alves Dias et al. (2018), World Energy Council (2000), 
Kaczorowski & Gajewski (2008).


















































































































































































































































































political authorities, that are under pressure from the hard coal sector and which 
primarily have political goals in mind.
It should also be noted that, currently, about 80,000 people work directly in 
the Polish HCM sector and about 400,000 jobs in enterprises are linked to mining 
(according to the Polish Mining Chamber of Industry and Commerce).6 A phasing 
out of coal, therefore, would be a very serious challenge not only for miners but 
also for many people in other enterprises. This again justifies the tactics of extrap-
olating to other social groups than just those employed directly in mining.
Altogether, especially in Poland, mining trade unions have greater resources 
(financial, human) and are able to mobilize larger and more politically signif-
icant social groups than ecological organizations and interest groups working 
for the renewable energy sector. The livelihood of several hundred thousands of 
families is directly and indirectly connected with the mining sector. Hence they 
constitute a very significant group of voters, who are particularly important in 
strongly polarized Polish society. It is additionally worth noting that both coun-
tries’ green parties play virtually no political role. This is a distinct difference to 
western European countries, and to some extent, this reflects the dominant social 
views on issues regarding energy sources and environmental protection.
3.5 C ontrasting the Polish and Czech governments’ positions on the 
EU climate and energy policy
How do we explain the Czech government’s turnaround and ultimate accept-
ance of the EU’s policy of climate neutrality until 2050? In December 2019, 
before the European Council meeting, Prime Minister Andrej Babiš pointed out 
that without the activities of other states, EU activity regarding CO2 reduction 
would be ineffective, that this would mean very high costs for the Czech Re-
public and would not be possible without EU financial assistance. He stressed 
that reducing greenhouse gas emissions must not threaten the competitiveness of 
EU economies. Representatives of the Czech authorities declared that by 2050 
they want to increase electricity production in nuclear power plants and from 
renewable sources.7 And according to Popp, trade unions in Czech Republic 
representing coal miners “have a strong influence on climate and energy policy 
and are strongly opposed to any measure that might impact coal. They have close 
ties to the government” (Popp, 2019, p. 5).
There seem to be several fundamental reasons for the Czech Republic’s retreat 
from its initial stance. First, its energy mix contrasts with Poland’s, as reflected 
in Table 10.3. The need to import electricity significantly hinders the transition 
from hard coal in Poland – simply, in the absence of sources of electricity pro-
duction other than coal (hard coal and lignite), there is no short- and medium- 
term substitute for this raw material. Theoretically, the Czech Republic could 
completely give up electricity generation from hard coal without significantly re-
ducing its energy security. However, in Poland, the situation is different. On the 
demand side, what will cause its growth is economic development (the estimated 
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increase in electricity demand for this reason is approx. 2%–3% per year), ur-
banization of large- and medium-sized cities resulting in an increase in demand 
for system heating (approx. 3%–4% per year) and the possible development of 
electromobility. On the supply side, the oldest power units that cannot be mod-
ernized will be phased out.
Even assuming the dynamic development of renewable energy sources and 
taking into account the current state of affairs and financial capabilities, it is not 
possible for Poland to soon abandon coal as an energy source. Furthermore, in 
recent years (2017–2019), a few new coal units have been built or are still under 
construction: 1,075 MW unit at Kozienice power plant, two 905 MW units at 
Opole power plant, 910 MW unit at Jaworzno III power plant, 496 MW unit at 
Turów power plant, and 1,000 MW in Ostrołęka C power plant.8
Against this background, Polish mining trade unions not only strongly de-
fend the extraction of coal, but also oppose measures that could impact its future 
importance for energy production. In 2016, NSZZ Solidarność took a very clear 
position regarding the Polish energy mix: “there never was, there is not, and 
there can never be approval on our part regarding the construction of a nuclear 
power plant.” This position is justified by the risk of failure and its consequences 
and the lack of social acceptance (NSZZ Solidarność, 2016).
Summarizing, the position of the Polish government toward the EU energy 
and climate policy is the result of both the political significance, mobilization, 
activity and cooperation as well as a unified position on this matter of mining 
trade unions, and favorable objective conditions. The most important is the Pol-
ish energy mix, as fundamental change and phasing out coal would take many 
years and require significant investments. The Czech situation is different. In ac-
cordance with the energy policy of the government, “the aim of the Czech Re-
public in the area of energy and climate protection is to ensure the transition to a 
competitive low-carbon economy and to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels” 
(The Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, 2015, p. 39). In 2020, the 
share of hard coal in total final energy consumption was to be only 2.7%, and in 
2040, 2.3%. In total gross electricity production, the share of hard coal in 2020 
is 4.6%, and in 2040, it should be 2.2%. The share of hard coal in the heat supply 
in 2020 is 15.3%, and in 2040, it should decrease to 10% (Ministerstvo Pruºmyslu 
a Obchodu, 2014). Thus, even though the Czech Republic has typically taken 
a skeptical stance on low-carbon development, it has often cooperated with the 
Visegrád Group countries in blocking European climate ambitions. However, it 
is somewhat more progressive than Poland regarding the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) and energy efficiency (Popp, 2019, p. 4).
An additional reason is trade union politicization. Informality is a characteristic 
feature in the sense that interest groups do not normally seek public office or com-
pete in elections, but pursue their goals through frequent informal interactions 
with politicians and bureaucrats (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008). “However, 
many nonpolitical interest groups are forced to become politically active because 
there is no other way to protect or promote the interests of their members or an 
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organization such as a business” (Thomas, 2004, p. 8). Consequently, the Polish 
trade union movement is strongly politicized. This situation dates back to 1989 
and even earlier, when, in the 1980s, NSZZ Solidarność was not only a trade union 
but also a social movement opposing the communist authorities. In the 1990s, 
trade unions saw and treated political parties and parliamentary representation as 
a tool of political influence. Several Polish political parties have emerged from the 
trade union movement, and trade union activists frequently enter politics (Zien-
tara, 2009). Roughly speaking, NSZZ Solidarność ideologically is center-right 
and/or right-wing and officially supported the conservative Law and Justice party 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość ) in parliamentary elections and their candidates in presi-
dential elections. Since 2015, NSZZ Solidarność has become an even stronger ally 
of Law and Justice. OPZZ is ideologically on the left or center-left and is politi-
cally closer to left-wing parties (Democratic Left Alliance, Left Together, Labor 
Union). FZZ is generally centrist. The most important opposition political party 
in Poland – Civic Platform – is not linked with any trade union.
These circumstances have very strong practical significance. At a time when 
the Polish government had to make a decision regarding its position on the EU’s 
climate and energy policy, Poland was de facto in a permanent election campaign. 
In 2018, local elections were held; in 2019, elections to the European Parlia-
ment (spring) and the national parliament (autumn); and in 2020, presidential 
elections. Under the conditions of very strong rivalry and political polarization 
in Poland, the Law and Justice government could not risk losing the support of 
mining trade unions.
In the Czech case, only 9,500 people work in mines (of which approx. 20% 
are Poles), which significantly weakens the strength of their political impact. The 
potential reduction in employment or even the closure of all mines will not have 
such negative social and political effects as in Poland. Czech trade unions had 
much less influence on politics after 1989 than Polish trade unions (especially 
“Solidarity”), and the links between Czech trade unions and political parties are 
much weaker. “Formally and institutionally independent of any political parties, 
ČMKOS’s position is closest to the Czech Social Democratic Party” (Drahok-
oupil & Kahancová, 2017, p. 9). It is one of the most important Czech political 
parties after 1989, and since 2018, it has again joined the government led by An-
drej Babiš, but in the 2017 elections, it received only 7.27% of the vote.
In addition, past experiences are very important. In Poland, the restructur-
ing of the hard coal-mining sector was very turbulent and accompanied by nu-
merous conflicts between the government as the owner of the mines, on the 
one hand, and miners and trade unions on the other hand, including the use of 
force during demonstrations by both parties, i.e., by trade unions and the police. 
In the Czech Republic, in turn, coal-mining restructuring was relatively calm: 
“in the Ostrava region, the miners’ union cooperated with the government – and 
the government consulted with the union – which led to a peaceful process of 
restructuring despite the significant decline in employment” (Bruha, Ionascu, & 
Jeong, 2005, p. 4).
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The third reason relates to differences in the Polish and Czech trade union 
systems. One of the most important features of the Polish trade union movement 
is its fragmentation. The hard coal-mining sector is among the economic sec-
tors with the highest level of unionization, in which several dozen trade unions 
are active. Very characteristic of the trade union movement in Poland is that it 
is already very pluralistic. This means not only that there are very many trade 
unions, but also that in many enterprises, there are several or even several dozen 
trade unions acting simultaneously. This is most evident in sectors where enter-
prises are primarily state-owned such as HCM. According to the latest available 
data, in 2014 in Poland, 72% of the total employees in the “mining and quarry-
ing” sector belonged to trade unions, which was the highest union density ratio 
by sector (GUS, 2015).9
The very high level of unionization, exceeding several times the national 
average, with several dozen trade unions operating in one mine, and employees 
belonging to more than one union causes constant competition and rivalry be-
tween trade unions. Thus, in practice, trade unions sometimes try to outbid one 
another when raising claims (e.g., wage increases, defense of endangered jobs, 
protests against mines liquidation, conditions of mining restructuring, conditions 
of employment, opposition to hard coal import, opposition to mine privatization 
plans, pressure for financial public support). Besides political involvement, trade 
unions in Poland recently frequently initiated collective disputes and organized 
various types of protests, demonstrations, petitions, demands, etc.
Another very significant difference in the Czech Republic is the predomi-
nance of a one-workplace-one-union principle, a legacy of decentralization af-
ter 1990 that eliminates such motivations in trade union activities as in Poland 
(Veverkova & Wegenschimmel, 2016). The most prevalent level of collective 
bargaining is the company level. It is worth adding that, as Mansfeldová writes, 
strikes are relatively very rare. Trade unions rather tend to declare a strike alert, 
which is announced during collective bargaining (Mansfeldová, 2015). In Po-
land, after Law and Justice came to power in 2015 supported by “Solidarity”, 
there were no strikes or very radical forms of protests (during the rule of the 
Civic Platform in 2007–2015, there was even physical violence used by miners 
and the police). However, mining trade unions almost always organized forms 
of protests such as petitions, mass crew demonstrations, underground protests, 
roadblocks, railway blocks, crew occupation of the mines’ offices, strike alerts, 
or strike referendums.
Therefore, taking into account the energy mix and the much smaller eco-
nomic importance of HCM and the much smaller political importance of min-
ing trade unions than in Poland, the Czech government changed its position 
of June 2019 and jointly declared the objective of climate neutrality with other 
EU countries – except for Poland. Two other very important factors are, first, 
a very large reduction in coal and lignite stipulated in the Czech Energy Pol-
icy until 2040 (Ministerstvo Pruºmyslu a Obchodu, 2014). Second, moving 
away from coal will enable the use of the financial resources from the Just 
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Transformation Fund, the EU financial instrument supporting regions most 
affected by the transition toward climate neutrality. Hence, the Czech govern-
ment considered that the political costs of opposing climate neutrality in the 
EU arena would be too high.
4 Conclusions
The position of Polish and Czech HCM trade unions toward EU climate and 
energy policy is clearly negative. To justify their opposition, they refer to ar-
guments that go beyond sectoral interests and aim to convey the impression 
that they also act in the interest of other social groups. Thus, they seek to 
‘publicize’ their position rather than ‘silencing’ the issue and achieving their 
goals ‘quietly’.
Despite the success of coal-mining organizations in fueling Poland’s opposi-
tion to phasing out coal, the long-term prospects of this strategy are uncertain. 
Rising prices of energy produced from coal (a consequence of geological condi-
tions and the EU regulations), together with falling prices of renewable energy, 
may decrease the importance of coal as an energy resource. This process has been 
going on in Poland (and Europe) for several decades, and the pressure of mining 
trade unions may slow it down, but it is not able to stop it.
Altogether, several factors explain the differential clout of mining trade un-
ions on governmental policy. In Poland, there are many more member-strong 
unions; they have relatively large resources at their disposal; and, importantly, 
they compete strongly with each other, which promotes the radicalization of 
their demands and tools used to achieve objectives (strikes or even violence). 
The political calendar and elections (to local governments, the European Parlia-
ment, national parliament, presidential elections), which were held in Poland in 
2018–2020, were also very important. For example, in the 2020 Polish presiden-
tial election, the difference in the second round between Andrzej Duda – openly 
supported by the trade union “Solidarity” – and the opposition candidate Rafał 
Trzaskowski was only about 422,000, which is almost exactly the number of 
people estimated employed in mining and sectors directly related to it. Taking 
into account the energy mix, the Czech Republic may consider it easier to give 
up energy produced from hard coal, and the social and political effects would be 
much smaller.
Finally, one cannot neglect the current impact of coronavirus on the sector. 
High infection rates among coal-miners have turned the traditional mining re-
gions into national epicenters of the pandemic. Resulting short- and long-term 
health issues may not only weaken the practical organizational capacity of min-
ing unions but also shed further doubt on the sector’s viability in the future. This 
unexpected calamity may further facilitate the decline of the sector not only in 
the Czech Republic but also in Poland despite the many factors outlined above 
that have stalled its downsizing.
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Notes
 1 Detailed solutions were included in secondary legal acts: Directive 2009/28/EC, De-
cision 406/2009/EC and Directive 2009/29/EC.
 2 https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pl/country/poland#actors-and-institutions (26 
December 2019).
ˇ 3 As Vevekova and Wegenschimmel (2016) note, according to CMKOS, which does 
not keep ex-act records on the number of members. Myant (2010, p. 891) writes that
the figure cannot be calculated with precision partly because of uncertainty over 
the exact level of union membership […] and partly because unions generally 
retained pensioners as members and these were often not counted separately. The 
number of pensioners varied enormously between unions, but often exceeded 
20% of total membership.
 4 Jan Sábel – president OS PHGN, Jaromír Franta – president SCO/CCG (Sdružení 
odborových organizací/Czech Coal Group) Jaromír Pytlík – president SHO OKD 
(Sdružení hornických odboruº , Association of Mining Unions in OKD).
 5 Only three very small hard coal mines in Poland are 100% private property: Przed-
siębiorstwo Górnicze Silesia Sp. z o.o., Zakład Górniczy Siltech Sp. z o.o. and Eko-
Plus Sp. z o.o.
 6 https://www.slaskibiznes.pl/wiadomosci, firmy-okologornicze-blagaja-o-pomoc-
czy-plan-sasina-to-fikcja, wia5-1-3235.html (22 July 2020).
  http://www.solidarnosckatowice.pl/pl-PL/przemysl_okologorniczy_potrzebuje_
wsparcia.html (22 July 2020).
ˇ 7 Boj s klimatickou změnou bude Cesko stát biliony korun, zapojit se ale musí celý svět, 
02 December 2019.
  https://www.osphgn.cz/clanky/aktuality/boj-s-klimatickou-zmenou-bude-cesko-
stat-biliony-korun--zapojit-se-ale-musi-cely-svet.html (21 December 2019).
 8 In February 2020, owners of the Ostrołęka power plant decided to suspend construc-
tion of the C unit.
 9 In the biggest hard coal-mining company in Poland (and EU) – Polish Mining Group 
(Polska Grupa Górnicza, PGG) around 43,000 people were employed at the end of 2017. 
In entities of the PGG Capital Group in 2017, there were 148 trade union organiza-
tions grouped in 24 trade unions, which included over 40,000 employees, meaning a 
unionization level of 93.1%. In numbers, the largest trade unions at PGG are: NSZZ 
Solidarność (24.5% of the total trade unions members in PGG), ZZG (15.4%), Sier-
pień 80” (14.8%), and Kadra (9.9%), Związek Zawodowy Ratowników Górniczych (5.4%), 
Związek Zawodowy Pracowników Dołowych (5.3%), other trade  unions – 17.8% (PGG, 
2017). In the second biggest mining company in Poland in terms of employment 
and hard coal extraction – Jastrzębie Coal Company ( Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa, 
JSW) – 28,268 people were employed at the end of 2018. At JSW, 125 trade union 
organizations operated, with 31,739 members. The number of trade union members 
is higher than the number of JSW employees because each employee may belong to 
more than one trade union. This meant that the union density rate at JSW was 119.9% 
( JSW, 2018). In 2018, the hard coal-mining company in the Lublin Basin – Lublin 
Coal “Bogdanka” Capital Group (Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka, LW “Bogdanka”) em-
ployed 5,420 people, and six trade unions operated in it, with 3,319 members, which 
meant that the union density ratio was 70% (LW Bogdanka, 2018).
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GUS. (2015). Główny Urząd Statystyczny: Związki zawodowe w Polsce w 2014 r. Notatka in-
formacyjna, Warszawa, https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/gospodarka-spoleczna- 
wolontariat/gospodarka-spoleczna-trzeci-sektor/zwiazki-zawodowe-w-polsce-w-
2014-r-, 10,1.html (Accessed 21 December 2020).
Horváthová, B. & Dobbins, M. (2019). Organised interests in the energy sector: A com-
parative study of the influence of interest groups in Czechia and Hungary. Politics and 
Governance, 7(1), 139–151. doi: 10.17645/pag.v7i1.1784
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Kadra. (2015). Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych “Kadra”, 340/2015/PZZ/DT, 
Katowice, 15 September 2015.
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